Quick blogging.

Click here for the links to publications by UN Bodies on Water Quality issues.

To give you an update, this is the list of speakers for the upcoming EPSCA 10:

1. Dr. Evita Legowo, Director General Oil and Gas, ESDM (tent.)
2. Trijana Kartoatmodjo, Deputy Operations, BPMIGAS
3. Benny Lubiantara, Fiscal Policy Analyst, OPEC (as Advisor)
4. Tariq Shafiq, Founding Executive, Iraq National Oil Company (also author of new Iraq oil law, Forum Chairman)
5. Ittiporn Boonpracong, Deputy Director-General, Department of Treaties and Legal Affairs (Malaysia-Thailand Joint Authority)
6. Faiz Shahab, Commissioner, PT Prime Petroservices
7. Joseph Amudi Tobing, Senior Legal Counsel, Hess Limited
8. Peter Godfrey, Vice President (Commercial), Arrow Energy International (on CBM development with PT Medco)

According to the Jakarta Post:

Currently, it is widely believed that many water companies are linked to powerful politicians, making the awarding of contracts, tariffs and other management aspects non-transparent and ineffective. Ideally, politicians that govern should act on the professional advice of the water managers and not the other way around. Another area of water governance that needs to be intensified is the war against corruption. In the water sector, there should also be an all-out war on corruption at all levels of governance, in both the public and private sectors. Government should make all contracts in the water sector awarded through open tender with public consultation to ensure professionalism, fairness, transparency, accountability and good governance. Equally, all contracts and other relevant documents drawn up between the government and private companies should not be "classified" but instead be public documents available to the public for discussion, review and improvement. Another area to ensure better governance is for the government to engage and actively involved all stakeholders in the water sector, especially civil society and NGOs. Finally, the Federal Government should reconsider its plans to centralize the water sector by taking it over from State Governments. This is because, centralization would be contradictory towards involvement of all stakeholders and also pose problems to many states that had already privatized the water sector. Finally, governance of the water sector should be based on Integrated Water Resources Management which is the logical way forward in ensuring sustainable development. 

To achieve the above objective, the government should make all contracts in the water sector awarded through open tender with public consultation. This would ensure professionalism, fairness, transparency, accountability and good governance. Equally, all contracts and other relevant documents drawn up between the government and private companies should not be “classified” but instead be public documents available to the public for discussion, review and improvement.

When a Jakarta citizen asks to what rights are they entitled as a water customer, there’s not much that the 1992 and 1993 bylaws can answer because the 1998 privatization has changed the landscape of accountability from Jakarta’s local government and PAM Jaya to its concessionaires.

Some of the answers could be provided in the concession contracts. Unfortunately, the concession contracts are said to contain a confidentiality clause and therefore are never to be found in the public domain.

Right to water skeptics normally pose this typical question: Why the right to water instead of governance?

Here's a short answer: you can't go to the court asking for good governance.

Illustration:

If you are disconnected from the services, you can't say to the judge:

"For the sake of good governance, please, reconnect me to the network."

compare with this statement:

"There is a human right to water in the constitution, I should, at least be permitted to pay in arrears, the disconnection is illegal."
 
Put it simply, the right to water creates rights and obligations. It can even create obligation for a good water governance. Remember, governance does not stand by itself. One of the indicator is the rule of law.

65. It is not known how many ad hoc funds there were, nor responses for one off payments, though there is reference to a number within documentation provided to the SFO by Innospec. These additional payments were variously referred to as the “Lead Defense”4 fund; “Lim WS account”5; “compensation fund”6; “extraordinary costs”7; “cumulative costs”8; “special funds”9; “promotion fund”10 or “exceptional promotional work”11; “special bonus”12; “cranes” 13 and the “Rachmat Sudibyo fund”.

 66. This fund was conceived and largely operated during a period predating the Indictment. In the first instance between 2000 until his departure in August 2002, a recipient of ad hoc bribes was Rachmat Sudibyo (“Sudibyo”). The “Rachmat Sudibyo Fund” was a corrupt vehicle to pay Sudibyo, the Indonesian Director General of Oil and Gas at the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources. He was in post until August 2002, whereupon he was appointed Chairman of BPMigas – the newly established oil and gas authority.

69. The Special Committee retained KPMG to examine all payments made to PTSI. KPMG found two large payments, one in 2001 ($265,000) and one on 8 January 2002 ($295,150) with invoices stating that they were: “For payment all Pertamina/Migas & Lemigas Personnel (sic) travel, hotel, daily expenses overseas during the year 2001 spent in promotion of OCTEL’s products, as earlier agreed.”.

76. Innospec’s agents therefore made corrupt payments to public officials at Pertamina which were not dependent upon or related to specific orders for TEL being made. Corrupt payments were made as general sweeteners “to clear the air”, through various mechanisms including the agents’ general commission, to “buy of [sic] some Pertamina people”, to maintain or increase market share.

77. Furthermore, Innospec’s agents also requested further funds in order to make corrupt payments to a rival agent – Wisnu – who had apparently been tasked with marketing Chinese-sourced TEL to Pertamina.

83. In 2003 and 2004, Innospec’s agent, Sebastian, targeted Suroso, who became the Refinery Director of Pertamina. It is believed that this position was second only to the President or CEO of Pertamina. In effect Suroso had authority, at least until 2005, to sign and agree purchase orders on behalf of Pertamina. Even after the creation of MIGAS, individual refineries and Pertamina more generally had certain autonomy to enter into contracts with particular suppliers.