Asia/Europe International Training Program “Strategies for Chemical Management” Stockholm, Sweden 12 September – 4 October 2016
New Online Course on Gender Mainstreaming in IWRM
Regulation of Community Water and Sanitation (Temporary or Permanent?)
Our FGD revealed that there are unresolved fundamental differences among regulatory stakeholders, in terms of whether CB should be perceived as a temporary “approach” with the overall intention to integrate it to the PDAM or “institutional” system in the future or whether it stands equally to the existing “institutional” system. This difference has created tensions and confusion in practice, but more importantly, brings negative impact to policy and regulatory reform.
According to a government official some PDAM consider that CB Watsan is a temporary solution in their business plan – thus Community watsan network is regarded as parts which can be co-opted and taken over, since PDAM considers that the only one who is entitled to provide services are PDAM and the rest can only provide services through concession with PDAM.
In addition, community watsan projects may, to some extent, contravene the exclusive natural-legal-local monopoly granted to PDAM. Furthermore, there is indication that some successful community watsan intitiative have grown large in a way that could match or even surpass existing PDAM. How these community watsan initiatives could coexist with existing PDAMs or – to maintain the economies of scale – be merged with or acquire existing PDAMs is a problem yet to be solved.
The importance of modeling behaviors and future development in order to develop understanding of the relationship between PDAM and CB was a common response across the FGD. Two fragment-scenarios may be a suitable approach to be able to foresee regulatory developments. The first is to view community watsan as a “temporary” entity which exist only for a certain period and can be “annexed” by PDAM for certain reason such as economic scale or environmental conditions such as surface water quality in which CB model would no longer be compatible and larger scale investment would be required for treatment. The temporary approach is consistent with existing regulation -- since existing laws considers that the only one who is entitled to provide services are State or Regional Owned Enterprises -- whilst the other may only provide services in concession with PDAM. If this scenario is to be taken, then regulatory reform should focus on short term solutions with the overall objective of integrating the whole system to PDAM.
The second scenario is to perceive CB as a completely different model that can develop, expand and supersede PDAM or other “institutional” system. CB is thus treated equally with “institution”. As, at present, there is no CB model above district [Kecamatan] level, this model would be quite speculative. In this model, the regulatory framework should acknowledge the diversity of models in services provision and allow either CB or institutional model to acquire each other. FGD participants challenge the conceptual distinction of CB/”institution” based on assets size, coverage or natural monopoly. Thus, in this scenario, the regulatory framework should be able to foresee the CB model transformed into large scale water utility.
Read the full research report.
Visit project page: Regulation of Community Water and Sanitation.
Regulation of Community Water and Sanitation (Problematique)
The following is a summary of the problematique chapter of our recent research project on the regulation of community based water and sanitation:
The government aims to achieve universal access to water supply and sanitation by 2019. According to some calculations, this ambitious target cannot be fulfilled by relying on regional water utilities (Perusahaan Daerah Air Minum or “PDAM”) alone. It is estimated that PDAM can only contribute around 40% of the total target, whereas the other 60% would be expected to come from community‐based systems. The policy framework for CB Watsan was introduced by the government in 2003. The 2003 National Policy on The Development of Community‐Based Water and Sanitation introduced a duality in Indonesian national water policy: one being “institution‐based” and the other being “community‐based”. OThe conceptual problem surrounding “community‐based” watsan is on the definition and delineation between CB watsan and institutional watsan. In the policy framework, the term “institution‐based” is used to denote water services operated by corporate water utilities including PDAM, whereas “community‐based” is used to describe services provided by local communities for their own needs. How communities and institutions are defined, at least in the academic sense, might not be compatible with what is intended by the policy framework.There are also inconsistencies and discrepancies in the regulatory framework from the national down to regional and village levels, with regards to the role of CB watsan. The legal framework at the national level appears to favour “institution” based watsan, such as PDAM. Community based Watsan’s role are considered to be residual – in providing access only where “institutional” system cannot serve.Within the community based watsan itself, there is a major issue with regards to the clarity of assets ownership. Our Focus Group Discussion reveals that in some large scale projects, the assets still belong to the ministry of public works as it has not been transferred and thus, is accounted as liability and subsidy. FGD participants agreed that “Assets transfer is Indeed a big homework. The legal frameworks need to be completed.”Some community watsan activist considered that assets should be owned by the “communities” whereas according to another, it should be owned by the village. The national policy on community‐based watsan on the other hand, advocates “community” ownership and suggests that a legal framework be conceived by the government to smoothen the transfer of assets from the government to the “community”. On the Pamsimas program technical manual it is suggested that it is the operation that is transferred, but not the asset owenership.We also found that there are cases where PDAM systems overlap and compete with CB Watsan. This is caused, partly by the introduction of the dualist system of watsan services in the 2003 framework. How these community watsan initiatives could coexist with existing PDAMs or – to maintain the economies of scale – be merged with or acquire existing PDAMs is a problem which yet to be solved, let alone, researched.The FGD reveals that there are unresolved fundamental differences among regulatory stakeholders, in terms of whether CB should be perceived as a temporary “approach” with the overall intention to integrate it to the PDAM or “institutional” system in the future, or whether is stands equally to the existing “institutional” system.There are also problems with respect to service standards and how the government can foster monitoring, supervision and enforcement of such standards through regulatory frameworks. Community initiative and demand‐driven approach is central to the community watsan movement. However, this approach is at odds with existing national legal frameworks requiring water and sanitation services to comply with minimum service standards enacted by local government.Whether or not similar standards should apply to both government owned water utilities and community watsan is a matter of debate. Some interpret “universal water provision” in the sense that similar quality, quantity, continuity, affordability should be applicable to everyone and every service providers. However, such ideal standard is difficult to achieve in Indonesian rural water provision, especially in the remote regions such as Nusa Tenggara and Papua.
Visit Regulation of Community Water and Sanitation project page to download reports.
Australia Indonesia Infrastructure Research Award: Research Outputs
Output of our research project "The Role of Regulatory Frameworks in Ensuring the Sustainability of Community Based Water and Sanitation" is available for download in https://crpg.info/41-aiira . In the homepage, you can download full report, mind maps, presentations and related articles. The homepage will be updated accordingly as we publish our research papers. Feel free to distribute this information to your network.
Our highest appreciation to Bappenas and Jejaring AMPL for their kind facilitation and support!
Join CRPG Expert Network!
Go to CRPG Expert Database.
Kepemilikan Perusahaan bagi pejabat dan politisi harus dinyatakan dalam website Badan Pemerintah
Tanggal 9 Mei nanti rencananya ICIJ akan merilis data Panama Papers. Mungkin tidak semua data yang dirilis, melainkan hanya data standar soal kepemilikan akhir perusahaan dan hubungan antara pemilik dan perusahaan-perusahaan cangkang yang ada di Panama Papers. Menurut ICIJ:
Untuk mencegah skandal politik dan penyamaran kepemilikan, CRPG memberikan 4 rekomendasi terkait transparansi korporasi dan kepentingan:
When the data is released, users will be able to search through the data and visualize the networks around thousands of offshore entities, including, when possible, Mossack Fonseca’s internal records of the company’s true owners
- Pertama, seluruh perusahaan yang didirkan di Indonesia seharusnya diberikan kewajiban untuk membuka kepemilikan akhir (ultimate ownership)
- Kedua, seluruh perusahaan yang didirikan di Indonesia seharusnya diberikan kewajiban untuk membuka kepemilikan manfaat (beneficial ownership)
- Ketiga, perusahaan-perusahaan tertentu, sesuai dengan risikonya, diharuskan untuk membuat analisa dan evaluasi terkait tokoh politik (Politically Exposed Persons)
- Keempat, politisi dan pejabat publik harus mengumumkan daftar potensi konflik kepentingan, yang dapat berupa daftar kepemilikan secara langsung maupun tidak dan kepemilikan manfaat atas suatu perusahaan yang pernah atau sedang dimilikinya.Daftar kepemilikan akhir dan manfaat (rekomendasi pertama dan kedua diatas) seharusnya bisa diakses publik di website pemerintah yang mengatur pendirian badan hukum. Sedangkan, daftar potensi konflik kepentingan (rekomendasi keempat), termasuk didalamnya kepemilikan saham, kontrak nominee saham, penerimaan uang, jasa konsultasi dan sebagainya, seharusnya dipublikasikan di website pemerintah terkait. Misalnya, untuk anggota DPR, di website DPR mengenai profil anggota, untuk hakim agung, di website Mahkamah Agung, dan sebagainya. Daftar potensi konflik kepentingan dapat diperluas sehingga mencakup kepemilikan perusahaan oleh keluarga sedarah dan semenda.
Artikel terkait dari CRPG: Four Mechanisms for Corporate Transparency (The Jakarta Post)
Conventional regulations won't work for 'sharing' economies
An excerpt from my OpEd in The Jakarta Post:
What is certain is that the old economy is being redefined. Even jobs are being redefined. Information technology is slowly but surely shifting “employee” into “workforce-as-service”. There will be fewer employees and more part-time work-from-home consultants. There will be fewer people going to offices and more people teleconferencing through virtual reality gadgets.
For lawyers, this means that the traditional elements of labor law, wages, authority (e.i. from a boss) and “a defined job”, are no longer fulfilled. The new workforce has more independence and outcome-rather-than-process orientation. So authority is rather irrelevant. They also receive commissions instead of wages. They also may not have a set of “defined jobs” — they may be working here and there on several projects.
For that reason, the existing Manpower Law may not be necessarily relevant for the sharing economy. Thus the government shouldn’t force manpower laws on Uber and Go-Jek. This is not to suggest that the new workforce should be deprived of their traditional protections — in terms of health insurance and pension funds and other benefits — that are traditionally provided by offices. It simply means that the government needs to think of new ways so that these protections remain available when the workforce has shifted from employment to services.
The same reason goes for transportation platforms. Taxis, for example, must comply with minimum service standards, such as being equipped with taximeters, assurance of driver’s physical condition, maximum working hours, vehicle maximum age and general safety standards such as functional seatbelts, functional brakes and regular checking to ensure that the vehicle is roadworthy. All these standards must be available to Uber’s or GrabTaxi’s customers too.
The real problem is how to apply these standards to a sharing economies platform. The government should not confuse regulatory goals with regulatory formalities. Subjecting vehicles to yellow license plates or registering them with specific licenses are regulatory formalities (means) to regulatory goals (ends), which is, among others, safety.
Now how do we get them to obey these standards? The current academic proposal from experts worldwide is through self-regulation. Some called them “shared regulations”, which denotes shared regulatory competence among several regulatory authorities and the companies themselves. Unfortunately this idea has not caught the attention of Indonesian policymakers and they are preoccupied with applying existing legal definitions to Uber, Grab or Go-Jek. As I previously mentioned, it won’t work because they can’t be categorized as per se IT or transportation companies.
See full article here.