Abstract:

The The provision of water and sewerage services has been in the public sector for thousands of years. However, the trend towards privatising these basic services has recently been growing. When dealing with Multinational Corporations (MNCs), governments face risks in the form of legal asymmetries.

This paper explains the theory and practice of water privatisation in Indonesia. It analyses the legal anatomy of privatisation, from the regulatory to the contractual levels. It attempts to highlight important issues and risks that governments and other stakeholders need to focus on when dealing with privatisation.

We've made some significant editing for this version. Download the full paper here.

Unlike in theocratic states, in Indonesia, clerics may issue a verdict (fatwa) but this verdict is not legally binding.

It is important to note that the word "God" appeared many times on the Indonesian constitution. Nevertheless, unlike the UK/Greece model, Indonesian Constitution is silent with regard to recognition of a particular religion.

There is no single article in our Constitution that mentions the name of a particular religion. Article 29 stipulates "the state is based on the belief in the One and Supreme God" but does not explain further -- "God according to who?"

Moreover, although Indonesia "is based in the one and only god", the constitutional practices in the past allowed non-atheistic beliefs (as implemented by the Indonesian Communist Party and local beliefs such as kejawen) to grow.

I therefore tend to conclude the Indonesian model sits somewhere between the German and the Greece/UK model.

The Indonesian Constitution is not neutral towards religion. It is "pro-religion" in the sense that it prefers and supports a theistic worldview rather than the non-theist worldview, but is nevertheless neutral on which theistic view it prefers the most. Thus, the idea of "state-acknowledged religions" (agama yang diakui negara) actually has no constitutional basis.

A pro-religion constitution means that religious adherents may enjoy more freedom of religion in positive terms (the freedom to exercise) through state facilities compared to adherents of non/atheistic beliefs.

However, the negative freedom (the freedom not to be forced toward a particular religion or belief) of all persons remains protected. The power struggle within a particular religion is clearly not the business of the state.

The state has no constitutional authority to dictate its citizens on which version of God it shall worship. Forcing a particular religious interpretation would infringe article 29 (2) of the Constitution.

Pfff, check this out:

In my recent visit to Jakarta I found out that things are worse than I had envisaged. What I have feared has become reality. Lands in northern parts of Jakarta have subsided. Jakarta bypass has subsided by 50 centimeters since it was laid. The deep wells in Jakarta have to go deeper and deeper to produce water, and their output has been dropping off with time and many wells have been producing undrinkable water. Seawater has infiltrated as far as 7.5 kilometers from the coastline into the land and corrupted the groundwater such that it has become undrinkable.

An interesting story from Reason Magazine:

I've been quite busy recently doing my university papers. But when I browsed the net just now, I discovered an interesting article which argues that genes might be regarded as an 'essential facilities'. So, I thought you might be interested. Here's an abstract:

With the IMS Health case before the ECJ, the essential facilities doctrine has taken centre stage in Europe. A recent report by the JFTC seems to suggest that Japan is serious about invoking this doctrine. However the parameters of this doctrine are far from settled. Antitrust authorities do not enough guidance on issues such as determining appropriate license fees for access, optimal number of licensees etc. In keeping with my focus on blocking and disease gene patents, I have dealt mainly with one aspect of this doctrine-namely the question of “essentiality”. Essentiality would in most cases help in a determination of ‘blocking’ i.e. if the facility is a non-essential one, then there can possibly be no blocking. However the converse need not always be true-i.e. if the facility is an essential one, but is widely licensed, then it is quite possible that there would be no blocking.