Regulation of Community Water and Sanitation (Problematique)

Saturday, July 30, 2016




Photo: Water User Groups at Tlanak Village, Lamongan, East Java





The following is a summary of the problematique chapter of our recent research project on the regulation of community based water and sanitation:

The  government  aims  to  achieve  universal  access  to  water  supply  and  sanitation by 2019. According to some calculations, this ambitious target cannot be fulfilled by relying on  regional  water  utilities  (Perusahaan  Daerah  Air  Minum  or  “PDAM”) alone.  It  is estimated that PDAM can only contribute around 40% of the total target, whereas the other 60% would be expected to come from community‐based systems.  The policy framework for CB Watsan was introduced by the government in 2003. The 2003 National Policy on The Development of Community‐Based Water and Sanitation introduced a duality in Indonesian national water policy: one being “institution‐based” and  the  other  being  “community‐based”.  O 
The  conceptual  problem  surrounding  “community‐based” watsan is on the  definition and delineation between CB watsan and institutional watsan. In the policy framework, the  term  “institution‐based” is  used  to  denote water  services  operated  by  corporate water utilities including PDAM, whereas “community‐based” is used to describe services provided by local communities for their own needs. How communities and institutions are defined,  at  least  in  the  academic  sense,  might  not  be  compatible  with what  is intended by the policy framework.  
There are also inconsistencies and discrepancies in the regulatory framework from the national down to regional and village levels, with regards to the role of CB watsan. The legal framework at the national level appears to favour “institution” based watsan, such as PDAM. Community based Watsan’s role are considered to be residual – in providing access only where “institutional” system cannot serve.  
Within  the community based watsan itself,  there is a major issue with regards  to  the clarity of assets ownership. Our Focus Group Discussion reveals that in some large scale projects,  the  assets  still  belong  to  the  ministry  of  public  works  as  it  has  not  been transferred and thus, is accounted as liability and subsidy. FGD participants agreed that “Assets transfer is Indeed a big homework. The legal frameworks need to be completed.”
Some  community  watsan  activist  considered  that  assets  should  be owned  by  the “communities” whereas according  to another, it should be owned by  the village. The national policy on community‐based watsan on the other hand, advocates “community” ownership  and  suggests  that  a legal  framework  be  conceived  by  the  government  to smoothen  the transfer  of  assets  from  the  government  to  the  “community”.  On  the Pamsimas  program  technical  manual  it  is  suggested  that  it  is  the operation  that  is transferred, but not the asset owenership. 
We also found that there are cases where PDAM systems overlap and compete with CB Watsan.  This  is  caused,  partly  by  the  introduction  of  the  dualist  system  of  watsan services in the 2003 framework. How these community watsan initiatives could coexist with existing PDAMs or – to maintain the economies of scale – be merged with or acquire existing PDAMs is a problem which yet to be solved, let alone, researched.  
The FGD reveals that there are unresolved fundamental differences among regulatory stakeholders, in terms of whether CB should be perceived as a temporary “approach” with  the overall intention to integrate it  to the PDAM or “institutional” system in  the future, or whether is stands equally to the existing “institutional” system.   
There are also problems with respect to service standards and how the government can foster monitoring, supervision and enforcement of such standards through regulatory frameworks.  Community  initiative  and demand‐driven  approach  is  central  to  the community watsan movement. However, this approach is at odds with existing national legal  frameworks requiring  water  and  sanitation  services  to  comply  with  minimum service standards enacted by local government.   
Whether or not similar standards should apply to both government owned water utilities and  community  watsan  is  a  matter  of  debate.  Some interpret  “universal  water provision” in the sense that similar quality, quantity, continuity, affordability should be applicable  to  everyone  and every  service  providers.  However,  such  ideal  standard  is difficult to achieve in Indonesian rural water provision, especially in the remote regions such  as  Nusa  Tenggara  and  Papua. 

Visit Regulation of Community Water and Sanitation project page to download reports.

Australia Indonesia Infrastructure Research Award: Research Outputs

Thursday, July 21, 2016






Output of our research project "The Role of Regulatory Frameworks in Ensuring the Sustainability of Community Based Water and Sanitation" is available for download in https://crpg.info/41-aiira . In the homepage, you can download full report, mind maps, presentations and related articles. The homepage will be updated accordingly as we publish our research papers. Feel free to distribute this information to your network.

Our highest appreciation to Bappenas and Jejaring AMPL for their kind facilitation and support!

Output dari riset "Peranan Kerangka Regulasi Dalam Menjamin Kelangsungan Penyediaan Air dan Sanitasi Berbasis Masyarakat" dapat diunduh https://crpg.info/41-aiira . Di laman tersebut dapat diunduh laporan lengkap, peta pikiran, presentasi dan artikel terkait. Laman tersebut akan diupdate seiring dengan publikasi paper kami di jurnal. Mohon agar dapat menyebarkan informasi ini ke jaringan teman-teman.

Terima kasih kepada Bappenas dan Jejaring AMPL atas fasilitasi dan segala dukungannya!


Join CRPG Expert Network!

Monday, May 23, 2016





CRPG is developing a database of expert in Law and Regulation. If you have a PhD Degree (or is currently a PhD Student) in Law or Regulation -- with some emphasis on Indonesia as a case study or research area -- and is interested on collaborating with us for future research projects and consultancy, this survey might be for you. We collaborate with researchers on a project, part-time, freelance or full-time basis.

Go to CRPG Expert Database.

Kepemilikan Perusahaan bagi pejabat dan politisi harus dinyatakan dalam website Badan Pemerintah

Thursday, April 28, 2016




Tanggal 9 Mei nanti rencananya ICIJ akan merilis data Panama Papers. Mungkin tidak semua data yang dirilis, melainkan hanya data standar soal kepemilikan akhir perusahaan dan hubungan antara pemilik dan perusahaan-perusahaan cangkang yang ada di Panama Papers. Menurut ICIJ:


When the data is released, users will be able to search through the data and visualize the networks around thousands of offshore entities, including, when possible, Mossack Fonseca’s internal records of the company’s true owners
Untuk mencegah skandal politik dan penyamaran kepemilikan, CRPG memberikan 4 rekomendasi terkait transparansi korporasi dan kepentingan:


  • Pertama, seluruh perusahaan yang didirkan di Indonesia seharusnya diberikan kewajiban untuk membuka kepemilikan akhir (ultimate ownership)
  • Kedua, seluruh perusahaan yang didirikan di Indonesia seharusnya diberikan kewajiban untuk membuka kepemilikan manfaat (beneficial ownership)
  • Ketiga, perusahaan-perusahaan tertentu, sesuai dengan risikonya, diharuskan untuk membuat analisa dan evaluasi terkait tokoh politik (Politically Exposed Persons)
  • Keempat, politisi dan pejabat publik harus mengumumkan daftar potensi konflik kepentingan, yang dapat berupa daftar kepemilikan secara langsung maupun tidak dan kepemilikan manfaat atas suatu perusahaan yang pernah atau sedang dimilikinya.


    Daftar kepemilikan akhir dan manfaat (rekomendasi pertama dan kedua diatas) seharusnya bisa diakses publik di website pemerintah yang mengatur pendirian badan hukum. Sedangkan, daftar potensi konflik kepentingan (rekomendasi keempat), termasuk didalamnya kepemilikan saham, kontrak nominee saham, penerimaan uang, jasa konsultasi dan sebagainya, seharusnya dipublikasikan di website pemerintah terkait. Misalnya, untuk anggota DPR, di website DPR mengenai profil anggota, untuk hakim agung, di website Mahkamah Agung, dan sebagainya. Daftar potensi konflik kepentingan dapat diperluas sehingga mencakup kepemilikan perusahaan oleh keluarga sedarah dan semenda.   


Artikel terkait dari CRPG: Four Mechanisms for Corporate Transparency (The Jakarta Post)

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Conventional regulations won't work for 'sharing' economies

Thursday, April 14, 2016


Image result for sharing economy


An excerpt from my OpEd in The Jakarta Post:

What is certain is that the old economy is being redefined. Even jobs are being redefined. Information technology is slowly but surely shifting “employee” into “workforce-as-service”. There will be fewer employees and more part-time work-from-home consultants. There will be fewer people going to offices and more people teleconferencing through virtual reality gadgets.

For lawyers, this means that the traditional elements of labor law, wages, authority (e.i. from a boss) and “a defined job”, are no longer fulfilled. The new workforce has more independence and outcome-rather-than-process orientation. So authority is rather irrelevant. They also receive commissions instead of wages. They also may not have a set of “defined jobs” — they may be working here and there on several projects.

For that reason, the existing Manpower Law may not be necessarily relevant for the sharing economy. Thus the government shouldn’t force manpower laws on Uber and Go-Jek. This is not to suggest that the new workforce should be deprived of their traditional protections — in terms of health insurance and pension funds and other benefits — that are traditionally provided by offices. It simply means that the government needs to think of new ways so that these protections remain available when the workforce has shifted from employment to services.

The same reason goes for transportation platforms. Taxis, for example, must comply with minimum service standards, such as being equipped with taximeters, assurance of driver’s physical condition, maximum working hours, vehicle maximum age and general safety standards such as functional seatbelts, functional brakes and regular checking to ensure that the vehicle is roadworthy. All these standards must be available to Uber’s or GrabTaxi’s customers too.

The real problem is how to apply these standards to a sharing economies platform. The government should not confuse regulatory goals with regulatory formalities. Subjecting vehicles to yellow license plates or registering them with specific licenses are regulatory formalities (means) to regulatory goals (ends), which is, among others, safety.

Now how do we get them to obey these standards? The current academic proposal from experts worldwide is through self-regulation. Some called them “shared regulations”, which denotes shared regulatory competence among several regulatory authorities and the companies themselves. Unfortunately this idea has not caught the attention of Indonesian policymakers and they are preoccupied with applying existing legal definitions to Uber, Grab or Go-Jek. As I previously mentioned, it won’t work because they can’t be categorized as per se IT or transportation companies.

See full article here.

Ini Dokumen AMDAL (ANDAL) Reklamasi Pantai Utara Jakarta

Wednesday, April 13, 2016



Perdebatan seputar reklamasi Pantai Utara Jakarta seharusnya menggunakan data-data yang valid. Dalam hal pembangunan yang berdampak lingkungan, data tersebut seharusnya tercantum dalam Dokumen Analisa Mengenai Dampak Lingkungan (ANDAL) yang merupakan bagian dari proses AMDAL. 

Data ANDAL bisa didapatkan di website Pemprov DKI dengan keyword "reklamasi" (sayangnya perlu login dan register). Tampak dari website bahwa data dokumen dokumen tersebut diunggah 2014-04-12. Tidak semua dokumen berhasil kami unduh, sebagian tidak belum ditemukan link nya.

Transparansi AMDAL ini penting karena pihak yang terkena dampak dapat melihat rencana kegiatan dan alternatif-alternatifnya. Pihak yang tidak setuju juga dapat mendasarkan argumennya perihal apakah analisa yang dilakukan valid atau tidak.

Berikut Data AMDAL yang bisa kami dapatkan:


Analisis Dampak Lingkungan (ANDAL) Kegiatan Reklamasi Pulai I Bagian Barat (Ancol) Seluas 202,5 HA

Analisis Dampak Lingkungan (ANDAL) Reklamasi Pulau H. Kelurahan Pluit (luas ± 63 Ha)

Analisis Dampak Lingkungan (ANDAL) Reklamasi Pulau C, D, E (Pantai Kapuk Naga Indah, Kapuk Muara/Kamal Muara, Penjaringan)




Lihat juga artikel Kompas berikut.

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Bagaimana seharusnya sharing economy diatur?

Monday, April 4, 2016



(Image: Psarros)

Literatur regulasi baru mulai ramai membahas hal ini sejak 2014 lalu. Satu hal yang banyak disepakati adalah perusahaan yang menyediakan platform marketplace seperti di atas membutuhkan kategori tersendiri di luar dari perusahaan IT atau perusahaan transportasi. Perusahaan-perusahaan ini sebaiknya diatur dengan model self-regulation (Cohen-Sundarajan, 2015).

Self-regulation dipraktikkan, misalnya, dalam pengaturan organisasi profesi seperti advokat, notaris, kedokteran, dan dalam beberapa hal, penjara dan sekolah. Dalam banyak contoh tersebut regulasi tak lagi terpusat pada pemerintah melainkan berkembang dalam lokus-lokus tersendiri (Black 2001).

Justifikasi atas self-regulation ini setidaknya bisa kita lihat dari (i) kapasitas regulasi dan (ii) insentif regulasi.

Dari sisi kapasitas regulasi, tampak bahwa ongkos regulasi yang harus dibayar oleh pemerintah akan besar apabila harus mendata satu persatu pengemudi Gojek dan Uber dan melakukan pengawasan terhadap ketaatan setiap pengemudinya atas standar pelayanan minimal. Sementara itu, Gojek dan Uber lebih memiliki kapasitas karena secara otomatis punya data dari setiap pengemudi, lengkap dengan pemeringkatannya serta keluhan penumpang atas pengemudi.

Sedangkan dari sisi insentif regulasi, kita dapat menilainya lewat dua faktor: (a) insentif untuk menegakkan dan (b) insentif untuk menaati aturan. Dari sisi insentif untuk menegakkan, aparat pemerintah memiliki insentif, misalnya, lewat lewat promosi jabatan. Namun demikian, Gojek/Uber memiliki insentif lebih karena berhubungan dengan reputasi dan kualitas layanannya. Biaya yang diperlukan perusahaan tersebut dalam memutuskan pemilik sumberdaya dari jaringan sangat kecil dibandingkan dengan, misalnya, biaya dalam melakukan sidang tilang.

Demikian juga dari sisi ketaatan. Soal memberikan helm bagi penumpang, misalnya, insentif utama bagi pengemudi ojek adalah akan ditangkap polisi. Namun, apabila ada ancaman lain seperti dilaporkan oleh penumpang kepada perusahaan, maka insentifnya dalam menaati peraturan akan bertambah.

Dengan demikian, peranan pemerintah (atas menu-menu regulasi tertentu) bukanlah sebagai penegak langsung atas aturan (enforcer) melainkan penegak tidak langsung. Pemerintah cukup membuat kerangkanya regulasinya dan meminta akuntabilitas ketaatan secara umum dari perusahaan. Yang menjadi pelaksana dan penegak regulasi adalah perusahaan-perusahaan tersebut langsung kepada para pengemudi.

Pemerintah bisa membuat standar tingkat ketaatan rata-rata minimal dari pengemudi (misalnya, jumlah rata rata kecelakaan) dan kemudian menjatuhkan denda apabila perusahaan tidak memenuhinya. Dengan cara ini, Uber/Gojek akan dipacu untuk terus melakukan penyuluhan keselamatan kepada pengemudi.

Baca artikel lengkapnya di Geotimes:
Jokowi dan Problem Regulasi Ekonomi Berbagi oleh Mohamad Mova Al'Afghani