Thus, a Human Rights-compliant blasphemy law should contain very restrictive conditions, namely that it is applicable only when it is “…necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others”. And, not only that the restriction must be “necessary” in order to prevent harm, it must also be “proportional” to the goal.

Enough has been said about the depletion of our supply of fresh water from industrialization, deforestation and climate change. Now, the rise of megacities is also complicating the problem.

In a recent report, the United Nations Family Planning Agency (UNFPA) predicted half the world's population would be living in cities by next year, with the figure expected to grow.

This presents challenges for more effective land use, transportation and the fulfillment of minimum daily subsistence. Cities that fail to meet these challenges will become "failed cities", marked by the rise of megaslums.

The problem with water is that it is complicated by the fact that policy in this area is highly intertwined with other sectors. More food requires fine agriculture, which can also mean more water. More clothing requires industrialization, which can involve the use of more groundwater and the pollution of water sources. Housing can also cause problems if built above water catchment areas.

Failure by states to provide their populations with adequate water for drinking and sanitation can be considered a violation of international law.

Under Indonesia's current system, access to "water sources" is guaranteed by the Water Resources Law. Articles five and 16 of the law stipulate that every municipality must fulfill the minimum daily basic water needs of its local community.

However, the Constitution is silent on the right to water. The Water Resources Law for example -- due to the absence of the right to water in the Constitution -- only cites Article 33 of the Constitution, part of the economic chapter regulating natural resources.

This could be a problem, since water rights could then be perceived as existing only as derived from the economic provisions of the Constitution. Contrary to this interpretation, the international community now regards the right to water to be a part of the language of human rights.

The Constitutional Court acknowledged that access to water is a human right in its decision on the judicial review of the Water Resources Law. However, the court's decision does not bear the same weight as a provision of the Constitution.

Explicitly incorporating the right to water in the Constitution does not appear to be helpful at first glance. Adding more words to the Constitution will not provide more fresh water. But that's not how the legal system works.

The law, operating in the language of rights and obligations, helps answer questions on how to prioritize the allocation and use of existing resources. If, for example, there is a conflict between the right of an individual and the right of a company to exploit water, who should prevail? Does an individual have the right to challenge a factory because the water in his or her well is being depleted?

With the rise of megacities, the problem most likely to emerge will be disconnections from the water network. Imagine that in the future -- all at the same time -- the quality of groundwater worsens, reserves drop thanks to interference with catchment areas and urbanization drives up demand for water.

More and more people will rely on water networks for their supplies. Will water companies be able to disconnect those unable to pay?

Here is the question of whether we should see water consumers as mere actors in the market economy (who get their water as long as they pay) or as citizens (who are entitled to water regardless of whether they can come up with the money). If such a cases were brought to local courts where judges were not aware that access to water was a human right under international law, there is the danger that judgments will end up reflecting the narrow, market-oriented view of the consumer.

If, once again, the water resources law is perceived as only a derivative of economic chapters of the Constitution (Article 33), then the outcome of cases such as the hypothetical above would likely follow what has happened with other natural resources such as oil, gas and minerals.

But the way people need water is not the same as the way they need oil, gas or coal. So it is not adequate to argue about the right to water within the realm of Article 33. The right to water must stem from the human rights provisions of the Constitution, and that can only occur if it is expressly stated.

This does not mean that processed water should be available to everyone for free. A price should be associated with it to encourage people to conserve available resources. However, the provision of water and sewerage should be from the perspective of being a public service.

Individuals receiving the service are not mere consumers purchasing goods in the marketplace. They should be treated as citizens receiving services from the state. Their entitlement to water should be guaranteed by the government even if they are unable to pay.

It is the state's duty to respect, protect and fulfill the right to water. The quality and quantity of the amount of water individuals are entitled to must be clearly stipulated in law and not left to market mechanisms to decide. Water companies will have to be efficient and sustainable but at the same time pay due regard to prevailing regulations. Therefore, regulations on subsidies to the poor as well as speedy and cheap dispute resolution mechanisms when it comes to water disconnections must be in place.

Putting the right to water in the Constitution will not directly solve our water problems, but it will clarify to the government that they have a constitutional responsibility to provide this most essential of resources.

So that as it may by passing restrained order by the council as well as the earlier order notified in notification no 529/(2)/2007 issued by the president of Pakistan which is equally contrary to the constitution I have suffered as under:

(A) Detained for all intend and purpose with my family members including my infant child of 7 years from the evening of March 9th, 2007 uptill now. My official residence is sealed with heavy continget comprising police and member of other agencies. For which there is no justification.

(B) The vehicles which were in my use have been taken away by means of a lifter out of which one has been brought back by a lifter without its keys.

(c) Staff of Supreme Court attached with me is reportedly missing and had been kept at an unknown place. I believe that they have been detained just to fabricate evidence against me. I have also learned reliably that my chamber was also sealed and reportedly files lying there have been removed and some of them had been handedover to ISI under the supervision of newly appointed registrar. Such act is contrary to all norms and practices. I being CJP is entitled to occupy my chamber along with my staff.

(D) On account of deployment of heavy contingencies I am not allowed to go outside nor my family members are allowed to do so. Similarly no one is allowed to meet me freely. In as my colleagues have no access to me and whenever they want to visit they have to wait on the gate for a considerable period during which permission is sought from high ups of Mr Justice Raja Fayyaz can be quoted as on one occasion he had to go back without meeting me. Similar treatment was offered to Mr Justice Munir A sheikh (Retd).

(E) My children are not allowed to go to school, college and university I am not getting facility of telephone cable and DSL. Similarly I along with my family members have been deprived from basic amenities of Life ie medicines and doctor etc. (F) No. panel of lawyers is available to discuss the legal and factual issues involved in this reference. This act I have already highlighted on the notice received on March 10th, 2007.

The ICCPR does not prohibit the death penalty but its protocols do. As Indonesia is not party to any ICCPR protocol, the practice of the death penalty will not violate any international obligation to the ICCPR as long as the treatment of the inmates on death row and the execution of convicts is conducted in accordance with international standards.

It is then left to the problem of constitutional interpretation. Article 28I (1) of the Constitution guarantees that the right to life cannot be limited under any circumstances, but Article 28J (2) states that "In exercising his/her rights and freedoms, every person shall have the duty to accept the restrictions established by law... based upon the consideration of morality, religious values, security and public order in democratic society". The debate goes on as to whether the application of Article 28I (1) -- due to the phrase "cannot be limited under any circumstances" -- is non-derogable, including by Article 28J (2).

The convict's attorneys think that the rights under Article 28I (1) belongs to the cluster of rights which are non-derogable, including Article 28J (2). The government on the other hand, is of the opinion that Article 28J (2) may derogate Article 28I (1). Toward this polemic, there are a few methods of interpretation that can be applied.

First, by using the literal approach, it would appear that prohibition of the death penalty is stated nowhere in the Constitution. The wordings of "cannot be limited under any circumstances" under Article 28 I (1) cannot therefore be interpreted so as to mean prohibiting the death penalty. A comparison with Germany and Vietnam's constitutions would reveal that the prohibition of the death penalty is supported with a written, literal expression of the articles of the Constitution. As Indonesia's Constitution has no such provision, the death penalty is so far in line with the Constitution.

Second, by using the teleological approach, it can be seen from the preamble that the purpose of the Constitution is to first "protect the whole people of Indonesia and the entire homeland of Indonesia". Indonesia reportedly has 3.2 million drug users with the number of deaths around 15,000 users per year or an average of 41 deaths per day due to overdose or drug-related AIDS infections. The state has a constitutional obligation to prevent these deaths and to prevent the occurrence of a lost generation. Thus, the protection of the people by the state is paramount and would constitute a higher obligation in comparison to other duties.

Third, using the systematical method of interpretation, it would be clear that Article 28 J is placed under the same chapter as Article 28 I, which is the amended human rights chapter. It is then conclusive that Article 28 J was made "in relation and with due regard to" Article 28 I. We do not consider it appropriate to interpret that the restriction towards the implementation of human rights under Article 28 J refers to clusters of rights other than Article 28 I. The restriction under Article 28 J appears to cover the whole set of the Constitution.

Moreover, under the social contract construction, perpetrators are deemed to have waived their right to life, which is protected under the law, by acting in a manner that results in the loss of life. Thus, by "knowingly" killing others and being aware that their action entails capital punishment, they have given "implied consent" to be punished with the death penalty.

No significant improvements in services have been seen since the Jakarta water business was taken control of by the foreign investors, as evident from the thousands of complaints sent to the companies. There are now a number of unresolved problems that the new investors will have to tackle as a legacy.

First, the scarcity of raw water, particularly during the dry season, as the companies rely too much on water from the Jatiluhur reservoir in West Java. Meanwhile, the water from the 13 rivers in the capital is too dirty to be processed into potable water.

Second, many people are unhappy about a clause in the agreement that provides for automatic water-price increases every six months. There have been rumors circulating that the privatization of the tap-water business was made possible due to collusion involving the family of then president Soeharto. Both Palyja and TPJ have denied the accusation.

Third, water privatization remains a controversial issue in this country, despite the enactment of the 2004 Water Resources Law. Many insist that privatization will deny the poor access to water.

Fourth, and most problematic, many customers say they have not seen any significant improvement in services since the arrival of TPJ and Palyja, although the two companies say they have invested a lot on improving water-supply infrastructure, such as the construction of new mains and the repair of old ones

The Court (with 7 concurring and 2 dissenting) held the Law to be “Conditionally Constitutional”. It considers the Law to be sufficient in protecting the citizen’s right and is so far compatible with the Constitution. It however warned that if the implementation is different than what has been outlined by the Court in its Decision, the Law can be subjected to a re-judicial review.

The Court is silence with regards to the parameters of “implementation”. Implementation can mean Implementing Regulations of the Law or the Government’ s Practice in the form of decrees, circulars or unwritten decision of the bureaucracy. It is not known as to whether -- for example-- a single cooperation contract between a regional government and a foreign investor or a bureaucratic behaviour requiring traditional salt farmer to obtain license from his village chief can be used as a ground for re-judicial review.

The author is of the opinion that examination of ‘Conditionally Constitutional’ should refer to policies of the Central Government and validity of the Law’s Implementing Regulations. It is also important to note that the Court tends to reinterpret the Law at several occasions in its Judicial Review as seen when examining Customary Water Right

Today I met with a large group of Residents, members of the Sellers Guild, to talk about the implications of a recently-developed LibSL product called CopyBot. CopyBot allows the user to create a replication of an object, including textures, that is fully permissive. Needless to say this product has caused tremendous worry among content creators who want to understand how its use may possibly affect their business. In particular, they are concerned about theft of their creations, and the potential for unscrupulous people to undercut their prices and essentially take away their business...
Merely copying something doesn’t mean that a copyright violation has occurred. The law discusses ‘fair use’, for example, as one type of copying that is not a violation. If you DO think someone has copied something you made and is violating your copyright by profiting from the copying then you do have the option of using the DMCA process to file a complaint.