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Strengthening mutual accountability and partnerships for WASH, Country Brief, Indonesia

[ Sunday, September 12, 2021 | ]


Source: Cunningham R; Al'Afghani, MM; Qowamuna NA; Winterford, K; Willetts, J (2021)


This study identified five main findings, as follows:

  1. There are various multi-stakeholder platforms in the national level in Indonesia which have varied characteristics, functions and membership, and some overlaps, and include five main platforms (Pokja, Jejaring, Sanitation Partners Group, Pokja PKP, Pokja Sanitasi). These platforms primarily serve as communication and coordination platforms between WASH stakeholders rather than serving to support accountability. 
  2. The social network analysis demonstrated high fragmentation and low cohesion across WASH stakeholders, with some WASH organisations having unique networks that they operate within, but which are not shared by other organisations. Donor and aid organisations had more frequent interactions with government compared to local NGOs and research organisations. 
  3. Currently there is no mutual accountability mechanism in place between national WASH stakeholders. Rather, there is evidence of accountability occurring internally within organisations or institutions. There is also evidence of accountability from development partner/NGO to the national government, and there are traditional vertical accountability mechanisms, a medium-term development plan to guide overall direction of the sector and mechanisms such as the Ombudsman and regular reporting. However, these do not constitute mutual accountability between WASH stakeholders. The existing multi-stakeholder platforms do not explicitly enable mutual accountability between WASH stakeholders. 
  4. COVID-19 did not change the existing accountability mechanisms. However, it changed the way WASH stakeholders communicate. The method of communication shifted from the traditional face-to-face communication to online communication. Online communication was considered to be more flexible, as well as cost and time effective. As such, by utilizing online platform, there is a potential to enhance participation of WASH  stakeholders in WASH discussion. 
  5. 5. Most WASH stakeholders had heard about SWA as a global partnership, but they were not aware of its specific activities in Indonesia. This is due to Indonesia’s relatively recent participation in SWA (Indonesia joined SWA in 2017) - as such most non-SWA partner organisations had no or little knowledge about SWA activities – and there was an absence of a multi stakeholder forum to facilitate Indonesia’s commitment in SWA. To increase accountability between WASH stakeholders, a forum that enables mutual accountability mechanism is needed. There is no need to establish a completely new forum as the existing multi-stakeholder forum can be optimized to accommodate this need – it is, however, important to redesign and improve the quality and effectiveness of the existing forum for it to function well. In line with the MAM, Pokja and Jejaring AMPL, which primarily function as a communication and coordination platform, can be redesigned to enable a process to hold stakeholders accountable for their commitments – allowing assessment, reviews, and necessary adjustments to the stakeholders’ performance. The MAM will have the potential to bind its members and enforce commitment implementation provided that there is a high-level support from the President as a reflection of political will as well as SWA’s strong support in the national and global level are essential to achieve this goal.

Download the full report here

Memperbaiki Arah Reformasi Regulasi

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Al’Afghani, Mohamad Mova. “Memperbaiki Arah Reformasi Regulasi di Indonesia”. Implementasi Penguatan Regulasi dan Hukum di Indonesia, Seminar Nasional 2021, Fakultas Hukum Universitas Ibn Khaldun Bogor, UIKA Press, 2021 (Bookchapter)


Abstrak

Reformasi regulasi di Indonesia masih didominasi oleh dua konsep: command and control dan regulasi publik. Regulasi di Indonesia dipahami secara sempit hanya sebagai “peraturan perundang-undangan”. Obesitas dan inefisiensi regulasi tidak bisa ditangani hanya dengan cara mengurangi kuantitas peraturan perundang-undangan yang dibuat oleh pemerintah, tetapi dengan mengalihkan fungsi regulasi dan dengan memahami insentif dalam regulasi. Untuk mengurangi obesitas, inefisiensi dan tumpang tindih regulasi, makalah ini menjelaskan beberapa teknik dan jenis regulasi yang dapat diimplementasikan, diantaranya: regulasi privat, regulasi mandiri, regulasi monopoli alamiah, regulasi berbasis resiko dan regulasi algoritmik. Keseluruhan teknik ini dapat dikombinasikan satu sama lain termasuk didalamnya dengan command-and-control


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Alienating the 'Private' Sector: Implications of the Invalidation of the Water Law by the Indonesian Constitutional Court

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Journal of Water Law 26/3 (2019)

In 2015, the Indonesian Constitutional Court invalidated Law no 7 Year 2004 on Water Resources. At the heart of the Judicial Review was the extent of private sector’s involvement in Indonesia’s water sector and the effort to regain “state control” on water resources, as required by the Constitution. In order to realize “state control”, the Constitutional Court decreed that state owned and region owned enterprises should be prioritized in the management of water resources. Further, involvement of private enterprise should be restricted and is only possible after water is allocated to other priorities. Unfortunately the Court did not define what is meant by “private sector”. This paper criticized the decision and discuss its far reaching implications.

Keywords: water, law, indonesia, privatization, constitution, private, constitution, policy

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Konsep Regulasi Berbasis Risiko: Telaah Kritis dalam Penerapannya pada Undang-Undang Cipta Kerja

[ Monday, May 24, 2021 | ]


Abstrak

Undang-Undang Cipta Kerja menekankan pada kemudahan untuk melakukan usaha. Salah satu hal yang menjadi perhatian adalah penyederhanaan perizinan berusaha. Konsep Regulasi Berbasis Risiko menarik bagi program penyederhanaan perizinan karena diasumsikan bahwa penerapannya dapat mengurangi jumlah perizinan. Namun, penerapan analisis resiko untuk menapis izin merupakan sesuatu yang berbeda dengan penerapan konsep Regulasi Berbasis Risiko di negara-negara lain. Selain itu, penerapan regulasi berbasis risiko juga perlu memperhatikan kritik yang tidak terakomodasi dalam Undang-Undang. Tulisan ini menjabarkan 4 (empat) kritik atas penerapan regulasi berbasis risiko dalam Undang-Undang Cipta Kerja, yaitu (i) format omnibus merancukan penilaian risiko, (ii) risiko volatilitas belum dipertimbangkan, (iii) risiko sistemik belum dipertimbangkan serta (iv) potensi “regulatory capture”. Secara konseptual, penerapan regulasi berbasis risiko memantik diskursus akademik mengenai pengertian regulasi secara luas yang telah jauh berkembang dari pemaknaan sempit dalam wacana akademik di Indonesia yang mendefinisikannya sebatas peraturan perundang-undangan semata. 

Kata kunci: Regulasi, Regulasi Berbasis Risiko, Undang-Undang Cipta Kerja, Omnibus. 

Abstract 

The Law on Job Creation emphasizes the ease of doing business. One of the things that is of concern is the simplification of business permit. The concept of risk-based regulation is attractive to simplify the programs due to the assumption that it may cut off a number of licenses. However, the application of risk analysis to screen permits is something different from other countries. In addition, the application of risk-based regulations also needs to pay attention to the critique that is not accommodated in the Law. This paper describes 4 (four) critiques of the application of risk-based regulation in the Law, (i) the omnibus format confuses risk assessment, (ii) volatility risk has not been considered, (iii) systemic risk has not been considered and (iv) potential “regulatory capture”. Conceptually, the application of risk-based regulation has sparked an academic discourse regarding the broad understanding of regulation that has evolved far from the narrow meaning in academic discourse in Indonesia which defines it only as a statutory regulation. 

Keywords: Regulation, Risk Based Ragulation, Job Creation Law, Omnibus

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Water Allocation Issues Under Law 17/2019

[ Thursday, January 28, 2021 | ]

 


CRPG released Policy Brief 01/2021: Water Allocation Issues Under Law 17/2019

Five issues on water allocation were raised: prioritization of drinking water utility, conflict between the same category of uses, groundwater and conjunctive uses, water footprint and the impact of jobs creation law.



Larangan Pendayagunaan Air di Wilayah Konservasi Mengancam Industri Geothermal dan Mikrohidro?

[ Tuesday, December 15, 2020 | ]





Policy Brief 01/20 CRPG yang berjudul "Larangan Pendayagunaan Air di Wilayah Konservasi Mengancam Industri Geothermal dan Mikrohidro?" dapat diunduh disini.

Pasal 33 UU 17 Tahun 2019 Tentang Sumber Daya Air (UUSDA) melarang pendayagunaan air di wilayah konservasi, kecuali untuk kebutuhan pokok sehari-hari bagi orang perseorangan. Pasal tersebut berbunyi: “(1) SetiapOrang dilarang melakukan Pendayagunaan Sumber Daya Air di kawasan suaka alam dan kawasan pelestarian alam. (2) Larangan Pendayagunaan Sumber Daya Air sebagaimana dimaksud pada ayat (1) dikecualikan bagi orang perseorangan untuk pemenuhan kebutuhan pokok sehari-hari yang tidak dimanfaatkan sebagai bentuk usaha.” Dalam Pasal 69 diatur bahwa pelanggaran atas ketentuan ini dapat berujung pada sanksi pidana berupa penjara sampai dengan 6 (enam) tahun dan denda sampai dengan 10 miliar rupiah.


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Pemanfaatan air dalam KSA dan KPA misalnya, diatur dalam Peraturan Menteri Kehutanan Republik Indonesia Nomor P.64/Menhut-Ii/2013 Tahun 2013 Tentang Pemanfaatan Air Dan Energi Air Di Suaka Margasatwa, Taman Nasional, Taman Hutan Raya, dan Taman Wisata Alam (selanjutnya “P64/2013”). Dalam P64/2013, air maupun energi air dalam kawasan konservasi dapat dimanfaatkan, baik untuk kepentingan komersial maupun kepentingan non-komersial. P64/2013 menerangkan bahwa pemanfaatan air dan energi air dapat dilakukan pada blok atau zona di suaka margasatwa, taman nasional, taman hutan raya atau taman wisata alam, kecuali blok perlindungan, zona inti atau zona rimba. 

P64/2013 menginduk pada Peraturan Pemerintah Republik Indonesia Nomor 28 Tahun 2011 Tentang Pengelolaan Kawasan Suaka Alam Dan Kawasan Pelestarian Alam (“PP 28”). PP 28 dengan gamblang mengizinkan pemanfaatan air pada KSA dan KPA. Pasal 37 dari PP 28 secara eksplisit membolehkan pemanfaatan air dilakukan pada Taman Wisata Alam (Taman Wisata Alam sendiri merupakan bagian dari KPA). Sementara itu, Pasal 34 dari PP 28 membolehkan pemanfaatan air pada Suaka Margasatwa (Suaka Margasatwa sendiri merupakan bagian dari KSA). Lebih lanjut, dalam Pasal 40 PP 28/2011 ditegaskan bahwa “Ketentuan lebih lanjut mengenai pemanfaatan KSA dan KPA untuk penyimpanan dan/atau penyerapan karbon, pemanfaatan air, serta energi air, panas, dan angin diatur dengan peraturan Menteri.”

Risk-based approach in job creation bill lacks academic rigor

[ Tuesday, August 18, 2020 | ]

Risk,word,letters,boggle,game - free image from needpix.com


Risk-based approach in job creation bill lacks academic rigor


The Jakarta Post, March 3, 2020


Mohamad Mova AlAfghani

Bogor. West Java 


Director, Center for Regulation, Policy and Governance (CRPG)


Despite the criticisms laid against the job creation bill, we need to commend the government for its courageous effort, not only to consolidate and harmonize around 70 laws, but also to introduce an overarching risk-based approach to our legal system. 

Most critics focus on two primary issues: (1) sectoral issues, arguments of which usually revolve around the “loss of protection”, be it for the environment, labor or certain aspects of human rights; and (2) procedural issues, with many criticizing the “omnibus” legislative process as lacking transparency.

However, few have paid enough attention to the risk-based approach used in the bill, even though this mechanism will fundamentally alter our regulatory system and may even raise question on whether it would be compatible with our Constitution.

Risk-based regulations require the government to prioritize regulatory burdens and resources toward “high-risk” activities. Risks, of course, constitute the “likelihood” and the “severity” of the potential impact of a particular activity: the higher the likelihood and the severity of the impact, the higher the risk.

The resources available to regulators for inspecting and monitoring are always limited. Thus, why spend taxpayer’s money on small risks? Regulations would be more efficient if resources are spent only on high-risk activities – or so the theory goes.

Indeed, the job creation bill follows this approach. Only high-risk businesses will require a license (Article 11) and the level of supervision depends on the level of risk: Hence, the higher the risk, the more intense the scrutiny. This sounds about right, except for the fact that theories on risk-based regulation have moved past this.

The bill overlooks two things that are addressed in the regulatory policy literature: volatile risk and cumulative risk.

The former refers to risks that could be high during a certain season but low during another. For example, theft and burglary in residential areas are volatile risks: They increase during long holiday seasons such as Idul Fitri when millions of people travel back to their hometowns, but are relatively low during normal days. Fortunately, these risks are predictable, so homeowners can hire additional security during Idul Fitri. However, other risks like those related to climate change may not be so obvious.

Other risks could be low or medium but they are actually systemic and thus, incur cumulative costs on society. Homeowners, for example, may park their second vehicles on a neighborhood street without permission. If we look at this individually, then the risk (in terms of severity) is low compared to truck owners who park their vehicles on the street. But if everyone does this (since a permit is not required), then the street will become clogged with vehicles and becomes a systemic risk.

We can see here that “locking down” regulatory resources and licensing only high-risk activities could be very dangerous, as this would mean that regulators will be legally required to ignore both volatile and cumulative risks.

The job creation bill contains a paradox: It aims to broaden the discretion of public officials, but the clauses in Articles 8 and 11 actually narrow it.

Targeting supervision to “high risk” (Article 11) also contradicts theories on regulatory policy. It is not always the case that high-risk activities must be exposed to intense supervision. Theoretically speaking, a risk-based regulatory approach shifts the burden of risk from regulator to the companies’ risk management system. In other words, if the companies manage their risks, no matter how high, the level of supervision can be reduced. This can be proven over time through their compliance records. Although this is the general rule, the UK’s Hampton Report of 2005 warned that random checks on historically compliant firms were still required.

Article 8 “locks down” the types of risk to several subjects: health, security, environment and natural resource use. Strictly speaking, anything outside of these four subjects are not considered a risk.

What if a certain cultural heritage might be lost due to certain business activities? Let’s say a traditional community holds a religious ceremony on a site they consider sacred, but the local government wants to build a shopping mall there. Is that activity not considered a risk? Unfortunately, no. If Article 8 makes it into law, then local governments can be legally forbidden from considering threats to cultural heritage as a risk.

This also shows that risk is a matter of perception. What constitutes a risk is different from person to person and from culture to culture. Whether a risk is deemed high or low can also differ from one person to another. Whether a risk is acceptable or not is also a matter of perception. The “risk” of risk-based regulation is that it may reduce regulatory activities into mere actuarial activities.

Another risk that risk-based regulations pose is the risk to public accountability. We cannot blame public officials from failing to address cumulative risks and other issues that are not considered a risk by law (such as the aforementioned cultural heritage).

In fact, risk-based regulations can be linked to bureaucratic incentives. For example, directorates and work units can be evaluated in terms of their budget. Have they used their budget “efficiently”, that is, in supervising only high-risk activities? If yes, then they are rewarded for their performance; if not, then they are penalized.

This can be dangerous, however, since officials are deliberately incentivized to ignore volatile and cumulative risks. Hence, “risks” can be used to measure the performance and budgetary accountability of a government unit, but at the same time, the government unit can evade accountability for activities that are not legally considered “risks”.

Finally, predetermining the types of risk in the bill (Article 8, point 3) will eventually cause confusion. In other countries such as the UK, risk identification always starts with a regulator’s interpretation of its statutory objectives (Black and Baldwin, 2012, Baldwin 2012), and “risks” are those issues that impede the attainment of those objectives. For the England-Wales water regulator (OFWAT), its objective is to “further the consumer objective”, and secondly to “secure … the functions of a water undertaker”. OFWAT then develops its risk-based approach for several items, from water shortages during drought to contamination and to burst pipes (OFWAT, 2015).

Therefore, in both the literature and practice, “risk” is determined by interpreting the statutes first and then detailing the subjects according to each agency’s regulatory objectives. OFWAT will thus have a different risk set compared to the telecommunications regulator OFTEL, for example.

Indonesia seems to be taking a different approach in the job creation bill, wherein the general types of risk are predetermined according to Article 8(3): health, safety, environment and natural resource use. If regulators actually experience certain risks in practice that do not fall into these categories, they will be overlooked. Our society will then bear the cost of this oversight. 

None of the above issues were discussed as far as the academic draft of the bill is concerned. The only relevant literature mentioned in the academic draft is the OECD’s 2010 “Risk and Regulatory Policy” report, which is wholly inadequate for a bill that could fundamentally alter our regulatory system.