Rules for Dwarfs Risk Regulation of Nanotechnology and its International Context

Tuesday, October 20, 2009

A conference on nanotechnology will be held in Germany 30 November-2 December. According to the website:

We convene actors from Germany, Europe, and the United States to link previously separated regulatory debates. Participants will develop regulatory recommendations for German and European politics in frank and open discussions. This includes the prioritization of regulatory approaches and principles to guide the development of compatible regulatory systems on both sides of the Atlantic.

The price is € 160 including accommodation and meals; a reduction to € 80 is available for students. More detail here.

KPK - BP Migas; Conflict of Interest?

Sunday, October 11, 2009

The Jakarta Globe reported:

In a move to address persistent allegations of corruption in the multibillion dollar oil and gas sector, the Energy and Mineral Resources Ministry on Friday appointed an officer of the Corruption Eradication Commission to the board of directors of upstream oil and gas regulator BPMigas.

Lambok Hamonangan, the director of gratuity oversight at the commission, better known as the KPK, was inaugurated as BPMigas’s deputy for evaluation and legal advocacy, a newly created position.

Mind my ignorance, but wouldn't this leads to conflict of interest?

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Calls for premarket registration of nanotech product

EEB calls for premarket registration, stakeholders consultation and adequate legislative framework before a deeper entrance in nanotech market is made. In its brochure, it deems voluntary regulation as unsuccessful. I have yet to see where the failures are, but the EEB claims for lack of participation on the enactments of these codes.

It appears to me that the EEB stance are 'precautionary' in essence and relies more on command-and-control approach in nanotech regulation. The argument may have some merit provided that there are huge uncertainties surrounding nanotech products.

More regulatory framework of precautionary nature may reduce the risk of future market failure. But over-precautions will have implications on the growing market for nanotech.

Read more here.

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The new electricity law

Friday, September 11, 2009

The House of Representative recently passed the new electricity bill. The bill is perceived by the media as a real attempt to liberalize the electricity sector in Indonesia. But is it true that the law is an attempt to liberalize the sector? How does the law protect investor?

Under the new law, electricity provision are segregated into generation, transmission, distribution and retail and the private sector is allowed to participate. The question is of course, in which segment can the private sector participate and what are the incentives, rights and obligation?

I will return with the discussion later. In the mean time, you can have a look at the new law here (in Bahasa).

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The Social Cost of Cigarette (and its advertisement) in Indonesia

Thursday, September 10, 2009

Pramudya has been very kind in providing us a commentary on the recent Constitutional Court Decision on Cigarette Advertisement in his post. I agree with him that the negative externalities arising out of cigarette must be borne by the consumer and that -- given the explicit contribution to income -- dealing with tobacco industry in Indonesia would not be easy.

A research by Achadi et.al. quoting WHO suggests that around 10% of mortality in Indonesia annually (200,000 deaths) are caused by tobacco. 61% of other deaths are caused by non communicable diseases which may be related to active or passive cigarette consumption. Another shocking discovery quoted by Achadi's research is that more than one in two household in Indonesia has at least one smoker, and 98% of them smokes at home. What this means is that they pollute the air in their home and affects their children.

What are the health cost to children who are passive smoker? A research in the UK shows that at a worst case scenario where everybody smokes at home, the health cost per child would be 16.000 GBP per year. If broken down into the number of cigarettes (20 per day and remember that british cigarettes contained filters, non-cloved and are typically milder than Indonesian), the cost would be around 62 to 92 GBP per cigarette. What it means is that in order to offset the negative adverse effect of a cigarette to children, each will have to be priced around 62 Pounds (or at a current rate, around IDR 1.000.000,00). I think this figure still does not include the opportunity cost for getting sick.

The cost of a Dji Sam Soe cigar is around IDR 750. But that's not the true cost. It will raise health insurance premium, dental care, house insurance premium (cigarette butt is a little friend for the big fire), car insurance, cleaning costs, retirement fund and many other items I cannot list down since I am not an economist. And remember, smoking near babies may cost another 62-92 pounds per cigarette (excluding opportunity costs).

If smokers are unable to pay these costs, this will go to the state's expenditure. Which means, in the end of the day, non smokers will be paying for the true cost of every cigarette through their tax.

I don't smoke but occasionally I bring cigarettes as souvenirs. Makes me feel guilty :(
Okay, from now on, no more cigarette for souvenirs.

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Behavioral Monkeynomics

Tuesday, September 8, 2009

First of all, a hat tip to my Canadian friend who referred me to this article at Science Daily: "Monkeys Follow Economic Rules Of Supply And Demand".


Cécile Fruteau placed food containers with highly-desired pieces of apple in two groups of South African vervet monkeys. For the monkeys there was just one problem: only one in each group could open the food container. This monkey had a low position in the rank order and was therefore scarcely groomed. However, as soon as she acquired the power to hand out apples she was valued more and was groomed a lot by the rest of the group. Yet she could only enjoy that privilege briefly; the researchers placed a second food container that could be opened by another low-ranking female. From that moment onwards the market value of the first monkey was halved, and she was therefore groomed half as often.


Lessons for mankind:
  1. Its not how you look, but whether you have apples or not
  2. Male (monkeys) are materialistic. No gender question here
  3. Beware of your competitors!


This one is most surprising:

A change in price - grooming for less long if there is another monkey that supplies apples - is only possible if a negotiation process takes place. Many economists assume that such negotiations can only take place if they are concluded with a contract. However, the vervet monkeys do not have the possibility to conclude such binding contracts and yet they still succeed in agreeing to a change in price for a service.


We, humans, should be ashamed of this fact. Monkey market can be very efficient even without a contract. Look at how their 'informal institution' can streamline transaction cost. No need for complicated regulations, monkeys can agree to reach amicable settlement that would bring welfare to their kind. If this were human, they would have to conclude a contract which will take sleepless nights no negotiate, pay a lot of money to the lawyers, file a claim to the court, bribe the judges, and in the end of the day, no one gets the apple.

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Indonesia needs a strong water services law

Monday, August 31, 2009

Following is my latest op-ed at the JP:


Indonesia Needs a Strong Water Services Law

Mohamad Mova Al `Afghani , Dundee , UK | Mon, 08/31/2009 11:56 AM | Opinion

The current condition in the water and sanitation sector is bleak. Only 31 percent of the urban population and 17 percent of the total population had access to piped water. Around 80 million Indonesians lack access to sanitation, contributing to 100,000 deaths annually and economic losses of up to US$6.3 billion.

The water law that was enacted in 2004 comprehensively regulates water as a finite natural resource. However, of all the law's 100 articles, only one (Article 40) specifically regulates water and sanitation services.

Meanwhile, the implementing regulation of Article 40, Government Regulation No. 16/2005 on the Development of Drinking Water Provision Systems (PP-16) regulates water and sanitation services only generally.

There are several possible reasons for this. The first is that the government perceives water services as a local problem and as such considers municipalities to be primarily responsible for water services. The second reason is that in order to avoid the law from being invalidated by the Constitutional Court, the Water Law does not regulate services specifically, but instead broadly and vaguely.

Indeed, the water law does not contain the word "privatization" but it does suggest at Article 40 that the "..private sector, as well as the cooperatives and other members of the society" may participate in the development of water services. Of course, some investment in water supply infrastructure can be small if they occur in rural areas.

However, in cities, water projects can be worth millions of dollars and involve multinational corporations and foreign lenders. It is certainly inadequate to regulate both these operations under the same article.

It is worth noting that the governance of water as a resource is different from water services, even though they are interrelated. The governance of water resources encompasses the management of groundwater, rivers, wetlands, lakes, catchments areas, effluent discharge and how water is allocated to competing interests such as the industrial, residential, farming and hydropower sectors.

The governance of water services is different as it deals with water supply and sanitation infrastructure (sewerage), as well as the rights and responsibilities these utilities have and what roles local government plays.

The interconnection between *services' and *resources' only comes where water is abstracted from the environment by the utility and returned to the environment as waste.

Due to the complexity of the governance of water services, some countries regulate them in a specific law. In the UK and Scotland, they are regulated under the Water Industry Act, and in South Africa they are regulated under the Water Services Act. France does not have any specific water services law, however, models of private participation are regulated explicitly through multiple legislations. These legislations, backed by the court, which can act as a quasi-regulator, explicitly acknowledges the legal relation between municipalities, consumers and concessionaire holders and regulates their rights and responsibilities.

The water services law has important functions for both consumers and investors. It protects consumers from disconnection or limitation of supply (in Indonesia, disconnection is allowed by PP-16, while in the UK and South Africa it is illegal to disconnect), it establishes a consultation mechanism for tariff setting, sets out transparency requirements and regulatory accounts, sets quality standards for drinking water and details consumer rights.

In Indonesia, the laws do not define what the "minimum standard of services" is, as it is defined in a contract. In many other jurisdictions, these standards are not subjected to market mechanisms through contracts but are a matter of statutory obligation. The reason for this is because a sub-standard service is a public health issue which requires state intervention.

Note that one of the functions of the water services law is guaranteeing the property rights of the water utility. Without sufficient regulation, investors mainly depend on contracts. The political character of water services sometimes presses local governments to assume control of some rights of utility providers, such as denying tariff increases, or even striping them off their concessions when they lose popular support.

The problem in Indonesia is that the government views private participation to be desirable in the water sector, but the Constitutional Court and the civil societies are very reactive to the idea. So the parliament and the government regulate privatization discreetly in order to avoid the wrath of the court and civil society.

In effect, privatization happens without adequate statutory oversight. This has strong implications for consumers and investors. For consumers, this means that their rights to enjoy good quality, uninterrupted water supply at an affordable rate and their rights to complain and to request compensation for substandard services is not legally guaranteed, but is simply a matter of private arrangements enumerated in a contract.

For investors, this means that their investment relies only in the mercy of local government in honoring their contract. If there is a dispute between the government and an investor, the court and tribunals will be left in the dark, as there are no clear rules that regulate the settlement of disputes. Hence, without a water services law, their investment will be at risk.